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‘What, you mean they were already talking about it back then?’, asked a genuinely surprised 
first-year student. And she followed it up with the - equally genuinely - indignant, ‘And they 
still haven't got anywhere!’. It was one of my first lectures in first-year environmental studies, 
and I was summarising the environmental issues and the way in which they had figured on the 
agenda since the 1970s. Naturally, I mentioned climate change. Today's students learn about 
this topic at secondary school, making it a ‘here and now’ problem. When you are 18 years 
old, you intuitively feel as if the world is only half as old as you are. The problems facing the 
world today could not possibly be more than a couple of years old. Soil pollution and 
acidification, the hot environmental issues from the 1980s, are of little interest to today's 
adolescents. Chernobyl of course they know about because it is part of history. But the 
climate is something that speaks to them much more. 
So my students were genuinely amazed when I told them that climate change had already 
been an issue in 1988, the year in which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) was formed. I also told them about the world environment conference in Río de 
Janeiro in 1992, where the Climate Treaty had been agreed. And I told them that it took a 
further five years before this framework treaty, somewhat watered down, was converted into 
the Kyoto Protocol. At 20 years, therefore, climate policy was older than this astonished first-
year student. ‘And they still haven't got anywhere!?’. 
 
 
The former next president sets the agenda 
While the climate problem has been on both the scientific and the political agendas for at least 
20 years, then, it is really only since the turn of the present century that it has become a public 
issue of the first order. There is no doubt that the film An Inconvenient Truth by the former 
American Vice President, former presidential candidate and Nobel Prize winner Al Gore has 
played an important role in this. The film, released in Europe in the autumn of 2006 in a blaze 
of marketing and promotional publicity, did indeed cause a great stir. Not only did Al Gore 
receive an Oscar for it, the film played a decisive role in  
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winning him the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize - I will come back to his co-laureate, the IPPC, in a 
moment. 
In the Netherlands the film was shown in all the major cinemas for weeks on end. In Belgium 
it received extra attention when Margaretha Guidone, an ‘ordinary housewife’, organised a 
special showing of the film to which she invited all the country's leading political figures. In 
exchange for this mobilisation of politicians, or so it seemed, it was she rather than the 
minister who addressed the next international climate conference. The housewife as political 
crowbar and as a symbol of a different politics; but also, with all due respect, as a political 
alibi. 
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that Al Gore's film did indeed have a major awareness-raising 
and mobilising impact. In my own town, Nijmegen, the alderman with responsibility for 
environmental issues arranged for all secondary school pupils to see the film. At the end of 
this series of screenings, he then invited a number of them to join a debate attended by the 
former Dutch secretary for the environment. A room full of 15-18 year-olds discussed the 
film with  
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great passion and energy. But the discussion centred mainly on what they could do 
themselves, what they could point out to their parents, and how all those small efforts could 
contribute to solving the climate problem. 
Al Gore's film, which has since won a prestigious Oscar for best documentary, is indeed very 
well made. As a lecturer, you cannot help but be jealous of the sensitising effect that emanates 
from a PowerPoint presentation sprinkled with splendid film clips, and from the gripping 
montage of so many spectacular images focusing specifically on the consequences of climate 
change. Moreover, An Inconvenient Truth has established a new iconography in the climate 
debate: images from space showing low pressure areas which develop into spectacular 
cyclones; still-lifes of sad-looking polar bears on broken-off fragments of ice floes; hugely 
powerful hurricanes which devastate coastal towns; crumbling and collapsing blue-white 
icebergs; dried-out, barren steppes where agriculture is no longer possible... 
Spectacular and impressive though Al Gore's contribution was, it could only be successful 
because other phenomena and reports had already drawn attention to the climate problem. 
Throughout Western Europe, including the Netherlands and Belgium, a succession of warm 
summers - with 2007 as the only exception in this first decade of the new century - played a 
role in this, with the extreme summer of 2003 being particularly notable. That hot summer led 
to an increase in the number of premature deaths throughout virtually the whole of Europe, 
especially among the elderly. In France, ‘la canicule de 2003’ resulted in some political 
embarrassment, because those additional deaths exposed the precarious situation of many 
elderly people, and above all the defective organisation of the health care system. But there 
are also other indications, and their number is increasing, that it is not just the weather, but the 
climate that is out of kilter; instead of around 800 mm of rain each year, the Low Countries 
now regularly have to absorb 1100-1200 mm; the number of rainy days has reduced, but the 
showers are shorter and heavier. From a scientific perspective, of course, all these individual 
phenomena cannot simply be ascribed to ‘the climate’. But the public are also aware that, 
since 1990, Flanders has been hit by more - and more serious - floods than at any time in the 
past, which have also affected areas where there had been no flooding in living memory. 
Other European countries - Austria, Germany, Romania, the United Kingdom, Switzerland 
and France - have all reported heavier rains and more flooding than in the past. And so 
climate change has become a highly visible phenomenon, even outside the cinema. 
 
 
‘Knowledge is power’? Or: controversial knowledge as countervailing power? 
It is precisely the number of indications that something is happening to the climate that 
prompted the United Nations and the World Meteorological Organisation to found the IPCC 
as long ago as 1988. The IPCC is a forum for climate experts from all relevant scientific 
disciplines and from virtually every country in the world, and it is affiliated to universities, 
private research institutes, non-governmental organisations, etc. This enduring co-operative 
effort by a series of agencies at global level is, no doubt, one reason why the IPPC was 
awarded the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize. 
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The IPCC is an unusual organisation for a least two reasons. In the first place, it fulfils two 
functions simultaneously, ensuring that the relevant scientific knowledge about climate 
change is kept continually up to date, while at the same time providing a platform for 
discussion on the most effective and efficient measures to counter climate change. The 
platform is only too well aware of this hybrid role between the worlds of science and politics; 
although it is not a political body, the IPCC's scientific reports are undoubtedly of major 
political significance. And although the IPCC is not a scientific foundation, in reality it does 
continually express value judgments on both current research and necessary new research. 
Precisely because of this position at the interface between politics and science, in the two 
decades of its existence the platform has developed a set of highly specialised rules to ensure 
the quality control of its reports and the decisions taken in relation to them. If the IPCC were 
to become too political, this could harm its scientific integrity; on the other hand, if it were to 
act too exclusively from the scientific standpoint, this would undermine the political 
relevance of its reports. Striking this balance demands special rules for quality control. This 
makes the IPCC itself special, and has set a trend which could also be useful in other 
controversial areas of knowledge and science both on a greater or smaller scale. 
The word ‘scale’ itself refers to the second special property of the IPCC: that it functions as a 
global environmental, or at least a global climate, institute. In some quarters that scale and its 
impact are a cause of jealousy and suspicion. But it may be that the IPCC is foreshadowing 
the way in which the world will, and perhaps must, be governed in the future in several areas: 
by experts, admittedly, but experts from a range of disciplinary, geographical and social 
backgrounds, the quality of whose work will be subjected to close scrutiny and who will be 
held accountable for it. In any event, the IPCC occupies a special position in the gradual 
development of a growing number of these hybrid global organisations; bridgeheads for a 
world administration avant la lettre. And this latter reasoning seems to be a second, maybe 
even the most important argument for granting it the 2007 Nobel Prize for Peace. 
Yet the expertise on the climate issue has occasioned controversy from the start, and still 
does. That is due in the first place to the fact the climate is such a complex system, and so can 
not be adequately pinned down and described using simple mathematical functions. 
Consequently there are many scientific uncertainties, both as regards the observed phenomena 
themselves and their interpretation, and as regards their causes and consequences. Do our 
series of temperature measurements really go back far enough to enable definite conclusions 
to be drawn? Is the climate change that the world is currently experiencing really essentially 
different from the fluctuations that have always characterised the climate? Is human 
intervention, with its enormous discharges of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, headed 
by CO2, really the cause? Alternatives put forward by those who believe that the human 
impact is overstated include volcanic eruptions, sun spots and other suggestions. None of 
these, however, have yet been confirmed; on the contrary. And can the ‘consequences’, such 
as increased rainfall and flooding, really be attributed to climate change? Even the clearly 
increased frequency of hurricanes and other spectacular phenomena, let alone Hurricane 
Katrina, which devastated New Orleans, cannot be linked directly to climate change - just as 
it is impossible to derive statistically relevant conclusions from other individual incidents. 
And if  
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the phenomenon itself is so little understood, its causes and its consequences so uncertain, 
why take measures? Why develop climate policy? 
Social and political exploitation of scientific uncertainty is nothing new. On the contrary, in 
the debate on many environmental problems we can recognise the pattern of the debate with 
Laocoon about the Trojan Horse. Laocoon urged the Trojans not to trust the Horse, claiming 
it would destroy Troy. He was not believed, even though he was right. Nuclear energy, 
genetic modification (GMOs), mad cow disease (BSE), non-ionising radiation and any 
number of other controversies present examples of the repeated use and exploitation of 
scientific uncertainty as a weapon in what is in essence a political debate. The climate debate 
takes this to a new level: from the very start some people, both scientists and non-scientists, 
have cast doubt on and attacked both the IPCC's dominant position and its diagnoses. Basic 
data have been disputed, observations distrusted, minor uncertainties exaggerated, the relative 
reliability of mathematical models extrapolated, the natural changeability of the climate 
system has been stressed and the role of human activity minimised. In short, there has been a 
systematic sowing of the seeds of doubt: if there really is a climate problem, and if the climate 
is changing, is that change not mainly attributable to factors other than our greedy, energy-
devouring and CO2-emitting economy? 
It is absolutely right that scientific findings should constantly be subjected to critical scrutiny. 
Scientists are not infallible: they too can be collectively wrong. But in the climate debate, 
there is reason to doubt the scientific motives of some ‘non-believers’, allied as they often 
were and are to think tanks which have everything to gain from a limitlessly growing 
economy and which had and have little time for issues such as poverty, development and 
justice. The Bush administration took much of its inspiration from these doubters in its 
rejection of the Climate Treaty, or at least its reworking of the Treaty to produce the still very 
conservative Kyoto agreements (1997). This standpoint is inspired much more by colossal 
economic interests than by scientific uncertainty: the interests of the oil companies, of the 
energy sector in general, of the automotive sector, of the aviation industry, of the transport 
sector in general; in short, the pillars that support the present-day economy. 
 
Climate change in the Low Countries: all challenges for policy-making represented 
Not only did the US government refuse to sign the Kyoto Protocol; it continues to frustrate 
further progress in tackling the climate problem in other ways, too. We could witness that 
strategy very recently at the Bali climate conference. But refusal and direct attack have now 
made way for a much more subtle strategy of counter-movement. For example, the USA has 
joined forces with Australia, China, India, South Korea and Japan to create the Asia-Pacific 
Partnership on Clean Development and Climate. In January 2006 these countries - bear in 
mind that together they represent almost 50% of the world's population and nearly 40% of all 
global CO2 emissions! - issued a declaration. Although the declaration does mention the 
climate problem, heavy emphasis is placed on the scientific uncertainty. As a result, in their 
declaration these countries agree that neither measures to tackle climate change nor a 
timeframe for doing so are necessary. 
 
  
[p. 105] 
 
 
It is difficult to formulate policy to deal with a global problem if half the globe does not take 
part. This is a problem for Europe as a whole, which is making valiant efforts to take the lead 
in climate policy. It is also a fortiori a problem for the Netherlands and Belgium. Both 
countries make a sizeable contribution to global emissions of greenhouse gases, with CO2-
equivalent emissions of around 200 million tonnes and 150 million tonnes respectively. They 
do this through their domestic economic activities, especially energy generation, industry and 
transport, as well as through the ecological footprint they leave behind through all kinds of 
activities in other countries. At a European level, both countries naturally make a smaller 
contribution in absolute terms to the greenhouse effect than Germany (20%), the United 
Kingdom (13%), Italy (12%) and France (11%). However, on a per capita basis the 
Netherlands and Belgium score well above the European average. So something certainly 
needs to be done. 
In the autumn of 2006 the authoritative economist Sir Nicholas Stern submitted an important 
report to the British government, and via the government to the EU, the OECD and the entire 
world, in which he discusses the importance, costs and timing of the policy efforts that are 
needed. Briefly summarised, Stern's report contains an economic calculation of all the costs of 
climate change, a cost-benefit analysis of all the measures to be taken, and an indication of the 
measures which are most appropriate economically. Whilst fully taking on board the 
uncertainty and the need for caution, Stern argues that it is more cost-effective to take 
measures now than to delay them. After all, the costs quickly mount up, and some weaker 
economies will barely be able to afford them. Although unquestionably duller than Al Gore's 
film, Stern's 700-page report thus makes its own contribution to placing the climate issue on 
the agenda, albeit mainly that of the political and administrative world. 
A substantial body of policy has been and is being developed and implemented. Like 
everywhere in Europe, the two Low Countries developed and approved climate policy plans 
and programmes in the 1990s and in the first few years of the present century. Some of them 
relate to the potential impact of climate change. It will come as no surprise that the 
Netherlands, a country with a third of its land mass below the present sea level and lying in 
the delta of three major rivers, and which therefore has a host of measures to protect itself 
against the water both along its coasts and inland, devotes a great deal of attention to 
removing surplus water and to the rise in sea levels. The low-lying regions of Flanders are 
also susceptible, but here, despite the recent floods, this increased risk from the water has so 
far not had the same impact in terms of new policy and additional funding. 
Much trickier are the measures designed to address the causes of the problem. From a policy 
perspective, the climate problem is entirely different from that other global environmental 
problem, the depletion of the ozone layer. There, the focus was on just a few specific 
products, which were made by a small number of companies and for which moreover 
substitute products could be found reasonably quickly and easily. With the climate problem, 
apart from a small number of specific greenhouse gases, such as nitrous oxide and to a lesser 
extent fluorinated gases, key culprits are methane gas and, with a (still growing) contribution 
of between 80% and 90%, the much more important CO2. This gas is released into the 
atmosphere in all combustion processes - and therefore in many energy generation processes, 
virtually all industrial processes and virtually all transport activities. This means that a 
transition to a  
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low-carbon economy or, as a very modest first step in that direction, breaking the link 
between economic growth and increasing CO2 emissions, is a very drastic and complex 
process. The problem is literally everywhere, and equally literally it is an intrinsic part of our 
present-day economy and technology. 
As we have said, the global context is anything but favourable for the development of a 
European, let alone a Dutch or Belgian or Flemish climate policy. In addition to the 
foregoing, since the terrorist attacks of September 2001 throughout the world attention has 
been diverted from the environment in favour of the ‘war on terror’ and everything that goes 
with it. This has also been the case in the Netherlands and Belgium: it is no coincidence that 
since 2002 and 2003 in both countries, with some time difference due to the local political 
cycles, governments have taken office which accord little priority to environmental issues and 
which have appointed weak ministers for environment policy. Politicians have also made 
things difficult for themselves by following another global trend, which has also affected the 
Netherlands and Belgium, namely the wave of privatisation, precisely in the energy sector, 
formally endorsed by Europe at the request of the companies concerned and with the support 
of the politicians of the day. The combination of a weak environment policy and a strongly 
liberal energy policy has led - and the statistics support this - on the one hand to the 
government scrapping a number of incentives for environmentally-friendly energy 
production, while on the other hand the privatised energy producers had little appetite for 
uncertain investments in a notion such as sustainable energy  
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production. The contribution to the total energy supply from non-fossil fuel sources has 
consequently fallen well short of both targets and expectations. 
Of course the energy and climate programmes in both countries look attractive. And of 
course, they provide for a broad arsenal of instruments designed to bring about a gradual 
transition to lower-carbon energy production in several economic sectors and to an overall 
reduction in energy consumption. The measures put in place comprise, firstly, the 
endorsement of increased production of sustainable energy, be it wind, solar or other energy. 
The policies comprise, secondly, a series of measures to encourage more energy-friendly 
technology in a variety of production processes, ranging from agriculture to industry and from 
transport to services. And, thirdly, the policy is to encourage consumers, citizens, car drivers 
and all of us to restrict our energy consumption. But of course, too, the implementation of 
these fine plans immediately runs into delays. First, and perhaps least important, are 
administrative reasons; more importantly, these plans are out of step with the long-term 
investment programmes of the companies concerned; and even more important are the delays 
due to the vested economic interests which may in principle support the need for a transition 
to a different form of energy supply but - of course - not at the cost of their own position in 
that field. The ambivalence of measures to increase the price of diesel, to name just one 
example, or to increase the price of flying, to name another, illustrates the policy dilemma our 
economy faces. The shortfall in investment in new energy technology is just one more 
example, though one of considerable importance. 
In short, climate policy exhibits all the dilemmas of policy-making at the present juncture: the 
policy has to be global, but the political system remains largely national, and therefore 
operates on a relatively ineffective scale. The policy has to be long-term, but politicians tend 
to be extremely short-term in their thinking - a not very effective timescale. The policy has to 
be fundamental, but the government has deprived itself of room for manoeuvre in many areas, 
including precisely those areas where contrat is needed. 
The answer to that first-year student's question, ‘you mean they were already talking about it 
back then?’, was short: ‘yes’. The answer to her second question was lengthier, and perhaps a 
little depressing: first the disaster, and only then believe the one who predicted it? The 
metaphor of what happened to Laocoon - strangled by snakes after his warning - offered an 
escape route which was, if not politically, at least aesthetically satisfying. 
 
 
